Bibliography for IP2031: Comparative Political Economy BETA

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Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons. 2010b. Constructing the International Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Abou-Chadi, Tarik, and Ellen M. Immergut. 2018. ‘Recalibrating Social Protection: Electoral Competition and the New Partisan Politics of the Welfare State’. European Journal of Political Research. doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12308.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2005. ‘Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth’ edited by P. Aghion and S. Durlauf. Handbook of Economic Growth.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. London: Profile.

Ademmer, Esther, and Ferdinand Dreher. 2016a. ‘Constraining Political Budget Cycles: Media Strength and Fiscal Institutions in the Enlarged EU’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54(3):508–24. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12306.

Ademmer, Esther, and Ferdinand Dreher. 2016b. ‘Constraining Political Budget Cycles: Media Strength and Fiscal Institutions in the Enlarged EU’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54(3):508–24. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12306.

Adolph, Christopher. 2013. Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Adolph, Christopher. 2018. ‘The Missing Politics of Central Banks’. PS: Political Science & Politics 1–6. doi: 10.1017/S1049096518000847.

Adserà, Alícia, and Carles Boix. 2002. ‘Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness’. International Organization 56(2):229–62. doi: 10.1162/002081802320005478.

Afonso, Alexandre. 2015. ‘Choosing Whom to Betray: Populist Right-Wing Parties, Welfare State Reforms and the Trade-off between Office and Votes’. European Political Science Review 7(02):271–92. doi: 10.1017/S1755773914000125.

Alemán, José, and Dwayne Woods. 2018. ‘A Comparative Analysis of Inequality and Redistribution in Democracies’. International Studies Quarterly 62(1):171–81. doi: 10.1093/isq/sqx089.

Alesina, Alberto, and Paola Giugliano. 2009. ‘Preferences for Redistribution’.

Alesina, Alberto, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote. 2011. ‘Why Doesn’t The US Have A European-Style Welfare State?’

Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alesina, Alberto, Nouriel Roubini, and Gerald D. Cohen. 1997. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Alesina, Alberto, and Andrea Stella. 2010. ‘The Politics of Monetary Policy’.

Alesina, Alberto, and Andrea Stella. n.d. ‘The Politics of Monetary Policy’. Pp. 1001–54 in Handbook of Monetary Economics: Vols. 3A & 3B, Set. Vol. 3. San Diego: North Holland [Imprint].

Allan, James P., and Lyle Scruggs. 2004a. ‘Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies’. American Journal of Political Science 48(3):496–512. doi: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00083.x.

Allan, James P., and Lyle Scruggs. 2004b. ‘Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies’. American Journal of Political Science 48(3):496–512. doi: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00083.x.

Allan, James P., and Lyle Scruggs. 2004c. ‘Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies’. American Journal of Political Science 48(3):496–512. doi: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00083.x.

Allen, Franklin, and Douglas Gale. 2000. Comparing Financial Systems. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Allen, Matthew. 2004. ‘The Varieties of Capitalism Paradigm: Not Enough Variety?’ Socio-Economic Review 2(1):87–108. doi: 10.1093/soceco/2.1.87.

Alt, James E., Fredrik Carlsen, Per Heum, and Kåre Johansen. 1999. ‘Asset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms: Lobbying for Subsidies in Norway’. International Organization 53(01):99–116. doi: 10.1162/002081899550823.

Alt, James E., and Michael Gilligan. 1994. ‘The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions’. Journal of Political Philosophy 2(2):165–92. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.1994.tb00020.x.

Alvarez, Ignacio. 2015. ‘Financialization, Non-Financial Corporations and Income Inequality: The Case of France’. Socio-Economic Review 13(3):449–75. doi: 10.1093/ser/mwv007.

Alvarez, R. Michael, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange. 1991. ‘Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance’. The American Political Science Review 85(2). doi: 10.2307/1963174.

Anon. 2003. ‘The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy’. American Political Science Review 97(03):407–23. doi: 10.1017.S0003055403000777.

Anon. 2009. ‘Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment’. Comparative Political Studies 42(8):1098–1127. doi: 10.1177/0010414009331723.

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Armingeon, Klaus. 2012. ‘The Politics of Fiscal Responses to the Crisis of 2008-2009’. Governance 25(4):543–65. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01594.x.

Armingeon, Klaus, Kai Guthmann, and David Weisstanner. 2015. ‘Choosing the Path of Austerity: How Parties and Policy Coalitions Influence Welfare State Retrenchment in Periods of Fiscal Consolidation’. West European Politics 1–20. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2015.1111072.

Armingeon, Klaus, Kai Guthmann, and David Weisstanner. 2016. ‘Choosing the Path of Austerity: How Parties and Policy Coalitions Influence Welfare State Retrenchment in Periods of Fiscal Consolidation’. West European Politics 39(4):628–47. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2015.1111072.

ARNOLD, TOBIAS, and ISABELLE STADELMANN-STEFFEN. 2017. ‘How Federalism Influences Welfare Spending: Belgium Federalism Reform through the Perspective of the Synthetic Control Method’. European Journal of Political Research. doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12196.

Arnone, Marco, Bernard J. Laurens, and Jean-François Segalotto. n.d. ‘Measures of Central Bank Autonomy: Empirical Evidence for OECD, Developing, and Emerging Market Economies’. WP/06/228.

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Babb, Sarah. 2013. ‘The Washington Consensus as Transnational Policy Paradigm: Its Origins, Trajectory and Likely Successor’. Review of International Political Economy 20(2):268–97. doi: 10.1080/09692290.2011.640435.

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Baker, Andy. 2005. ‘Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs’. American Journal of Political Science 49(4):924–38. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00164.x.

Baldwin, Robert, Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge. 2011. Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Baldwin, Robert, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge. 2011b. Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Baldwin, Robert, Martin Cave, Martin Lodge, and Oxford Handbooks Online. 2010b. The Oxford Handbook of Regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Ban, Cornel, and Mark Blyth. 2013. ‘The BRICs and the Washington Consensus: An Introduction’. Review of International Political Economy 20(2):241–55. doi: 10.1080/09692290.2013.779374.

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Barnes, L. 2015. ‘The Size and Shape of Government: Preferences over Redistributive Tax Policy’. Socio-Economic Review 13(1):55–78. doi: 10.1093/ser/mwu007.

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Bartels, Larry M. 2005. ‘Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American  Mind’. Perspectives on Politics 3(01). doi: 10.1017/S1537592705050036.

Baum, Matthew A., and David A. Lake. 2003. ‘The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital’. American Journal of Political Science 47(2):333–47. doi: 10.1111/1540-5907.00023.

Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, and EBL. 2009. Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Baumgartner, Frank R., Marcello Carammia, Derek A. Epp, Ben Noble, Beatriz Rey, and Tevfik Murat Yildirim. 2017a. ‘Budgetary Change in Authoritarian and Democratic Regimes’. Journal of European Public Policy 1–17. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1296482.

Baumgartner, Frank R., Marcello Carammia, Derek A. Epp, Ben Noble, Beatriz Rey, and Tevfik Murat Yildirim. 2017b. ‘Budgetary Change in Authoritarian and Democratic Regimes’. Journal of European Public Policy 1–17. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1296482.

Baxter, Lawrence. 2011. ‘Capture in Financial Regulation: Can We Redirect It Toward the Common Good?’ Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy.

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Beaulieu, Eugene, Michael Benarroch, and James D. Gaisford. 2011. ‘Intra-Industry Trade Liberalization: Why Skilled Workers Are More Likely to Support Free Trade’. Review of International Economics 19(3):579–94. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2011.00967.x.

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Becker, Gary S. 1983b. ‘A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3). doi: 10.2307/1886017.

Béland, Daniel, Robert Henry Cox, and Oxford Scholarship Online Political Science. 2011. Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research. Oxford, [England]: Oxford University Press.

Belke, Ansgar, and Niklas Potrafke. 2012a. ‘Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries’. Journal of International Money and Finance 31(5):1126–39. doi: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2011.12.014.

Belke, Ansgar, and Niklas Potrafke. 2012b. ‘Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries’. Journal of International Money and Finance 31(5):1126–39. doi: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2011.12.014.

Belke, Ansgar, and Niklas Potrafke. 2012c. ‘Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries’. Journal of International Money and Finance 31(5):1126–39. doi: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2011.12.014.

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Bell, Stephen. 2012a. ‘The Power of Ideas: The Ideational Shaping of the Structural Power of Business’. International Studies Quarterly 56(4):661–73. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00743.x.

Bell, Stephen. 2012b. ‘The Power of Ideas: The Ideational Shaping of the Structural Power of Business’. International Studies Quarterly 56(4):661–73. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00743.x.

Berger, Suzanne. 2000. ‘Globalization and Politics’. Annual Review of Political Science 3(1):43–62. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.43.

Berger, Suzanne, and Ronald Dore. 1996. National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Vol. Cornell studies in political economy. Ithaca, [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press.

Bermeo, Nancy. 2001. Unemployment in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bermeo, Nancy. 2009. ‘Does Electoral Democracy Boost Economic Equality?’ Journal of Democracy 20(4):21–35. doi: 10.1353/jod.0.0112.

Bernhard, William. 1998. ‘A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence’. The American Political Science Review 92(2). doi: 10.2307/2585666.

Bernhard, William, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark. 2002. ‘The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions’. International Organization 56(4):693–723. doi: 10.1162/002081802760403748.

Bernhard, William, and David Leblang. 1999. ‘Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commitments’. International Organization 53(01):71–97. doi: 10.1162/002081899550814.

Beyer, Jürgen, and Martin Hoppner. 2003. ‘The Disintegration of Organised Capitalism: German Corporate Governance in the 1990s’. West European Politics 26(4):179–98. doi: 10.1080/01402380312331280738.

Beyers, Jan, and Caelesta Braun. 2014. ‘Ties That Count: Explaining Interest Group Access to Policymakers’. Journal of Public Policy 34(01):93–121. doi: 10.1017/S0143814X13000263.

Binder, Sarah, and Mark Spindel. 2018. ‘Why Study Monetary Politics?’ PS: Political Science & Politics 1–5. doi: 10.1017/S1049096518000835.

Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær, and Peter Munk Christiansen. 2015. ‘From Classic to Modern Corporatism. Interest Group Representation in Danish Public Committees in 1975 and 2010’. Journal of European Public Policy 22(7):1022–39. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2014.1000365.

Blais, Andre, Donald Blake, and Stephane Dion. 1993a. ‘Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies’. American Journal of Political Science 37(1). doi: 10.2307/2111523.

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Blyth, Mark. 2001a. ‘The Transformation of the Swedish Model: Economic Ideas, Distributional Conflict, and Institutional Change’. World Politics 54(01):1–26. doi: 10.1353/wp.2001.0020.

Blyth, Mark. 2001b. ‘The Transformation of the Swedish Model: Economic Ideas, Distributional Conflict, and Institutional Change’. World Politics 54(01):1–26. doi: 10.1353/wp.2001.0020.

Blyth, Mark. 2002. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blyth, Mark. 2013a. ‘Austerity as Ideology: A Reply to My Critics’. Comparative European Politics 11(6):737–51. doi: 10.1057/cep.2013.25.

Blyth, Mark. 2013b. ‘Paradigms and Paradox: The Politics of Economic Ideas in Two Moments of Crisis’. Governance 26(2):197–215. doi: 10.1111/gove.12010.

Blyth, Mark. 2015. ‘The New Ideas Scholarship in the Mirror of Historical Institutionalism: A Case of Old Whines in New Bottles?’ Journal of European Public Policy 1–8. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2015.1118292.

Blyth, Mark and EBL. 2013. Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Blyth, Mark M. 1997. ‘“Any More Bright Ideas?” The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy’. Comparative Politics 29(2). doi: 10.2307/422082.

Bodea, Cristina. 2013. ‘Independent Central Banks, Regime Type, and Fiscal Performance: The Case of Post-Communist Countries’. Public Choice 155(1–2):81–107. doi: 10.1007/s11127-011-9843-6.

Bodea, Cristina, and Raymond Hicks. 2014. ‘Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions’. International Organization 1–27. doi: 10.1017/S0020818314000277.

Bodea, Cristina, and Masaaki Higashijima. 2015. ‘Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending?’ British Journal of Political Science 1–24. doi: 10.1017/S0007123415000058.

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Boix, Carles. 1997. ‘Political Parties and the Supply Side of the Economy: The Provision of Physical and Human Capital in Advanced Economies, 1960-90’. American Journal of Political Science 41(3). doi: 10.2307/2111676.

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Boix, Carles. 1998c. Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boix, Carles. 1998d. Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boix, Carles. 2000. ‘Partisan Governments, the International Economy, and Macroeconomic Policies in Advanced Nations, 1960–93’. World Politics 53(01):38–73. doi: 10.1017/S0043887100009370.

Boix, Carles, Susan C. Stokes, and Oxford Handbooks Online. n.d. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, Incorporated.

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Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. ‘Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes’. International Organization 56(4):861–87. doi: 10.1162/002081802760403801.

Broz, Lawrence. 2015. ‘The Federal Reserve as Global Lender of Last Resort, 2007-2010’.

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Busemeyer, Marius R., and Julian L. Garritzmann. 2017. ‘Public Opinion on Policy and Budgetary Trade-Offs in European Welfare States: Evidence from a New Comparative Survey’. Journal of European Public Policy 1–19. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1298658.

Callaghan, H. 2015. ‘Who Cares about Financialization? Self-Reinforcing Feedback, Issue Salience, and Increasing Acquiescence to Market-Enabling Takeover Rules’. Socio-Economic Review. doi: 10.1093/ser/mwu037.

Callaghan, Helen. 2009. ‘Insiders, Outsiders, and the Politics of Corporate Governance: How Ownership Structure Shapes Party Positions in Britain, Germany, and France’. Comparative Political Studies 42(6):733–62. doi: 10.1177/0010414008329895.

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