Bibliography for IP2031: Comparative Political Economy BETA

1.

Lichbach MI, Zuckerman AS. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press; 2009. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804007

2.

Clift B. Comparative Political Economy: States, Markets and Global Capitalism. Second edition. Macmillan International Higher Education; 2021.

3.

Frieden JA. Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century. W.W. Norton; 2007.

4.

Wittman D, Weingast BR, Oxford University Press Staff, Oxford Handbooks Online. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford University Press, Incorporated https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fedited-volume%2F44403

5.

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6.

Lichbach MI, Zuckerman AS. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press; 2009. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804007

7.

Knutsen CH. Democracy and economic growth: A survey of arguments and results. International Area Studies Review. 2012;15(4):393-415. doi:10.1177/2233865912455268

8.

Cox G, McCubbins M. ’The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes. Presidents, parliaments, and policy. 2001;Political economy of institutions and decisions. http://wcfia.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/671_mccubbins_cox.pdf?m=1427473083

9.

Olson M. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. The American Political Science Review. 1993;87(3). doi:10.2307/2938736

10.

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11.

Olson M. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. Yale University Press; 1982. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt1nprdd

12.

Lichbach MI, Zuckerman AS. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press; 2009. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804007

13.

Wittman D, Weingast BR, Oxford University Press Staff, Oxford Handbooks Online. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford University Press, Incorporated https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fedited-volume%2F44403

14.

Quinn DP, Woolley JT. Democracy and National Economic Performance: The Preference for Stability. American Journal of Political Science. 2001;45(3). doi:10.2307/2669243

15.

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16.

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17.

Doucouliagos H, Ulubaşoğlu MA. Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis. American Journal of Political Science. 2008;52(1):61-83. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00299.x

18.

North DC. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press; 1990. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678

19.

Acemoglu D, Robinson JA. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Profile; 2012.

20.

Przeworski A, Alvarez ME, Cheibub JA, Limongi F. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Vol no. 3. Cambridge University Press; 2000. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804946

21.

Hall PA, Taylor RCR. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies. 1996;44(5):936-957. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x

22.

Acemoglu D, Johnson S, Robinson JA. Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth. Aghion P, Durlauf S, eds. Handbook of Economic Growth. Published online 2005. http://economics.mit.edu/files/4469

23.

Barry R. Weingast. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 1995;11(1):1-31. http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/1/1.extract

24.

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25.

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26.

Beaulieu E, Cox GW, Saiegh S. Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage. International Organization. 2012;66(04):709-738. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000288

27.

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28.

Jensen NM. Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political  Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment. International Organization. 2003;57(03). doi:10.1017/S0020818303573040

29.

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30.

Gandhi J. Dictatorial Institutions and their Impact on Economic Growth. European Journal of Sociology. 2008;49(01). doi:10.1017/S0003975608000015

31.

Bailey MA, Goldstein J, Weingast BR. The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade. World Politics. 1997;49(3):309-338. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054005?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

32.

Mansfield ED, Milner HV, Rosendorff BP. Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade. The American Political Science Review. 2000;94(2). doi:10.2307/2586014

33.

Rickard SJ. A Non-Tariff Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: Government Subsidies and Electoral Institutions. International Studies Quarterly. 2012;56(4):777-785. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00760.x

34.

Rickard SJ. A Non-Tariff Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: Government Subsidies and Electoral Institutions. International Studies Quarterly. 2012;56(4):777-785. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00760.x

35.

Rogowski R. Trade and the variety of democratic institutions. International Organization. 1987;41(02). doi:10.1017/S0020818300027442

36.

Ehrlich SD. Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in  Democracies. International Organization. 2007;61(03). doi:10.1017/S0020818307070191

37.

Hiscox MJ. The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization. International Organization. 1999;53(04):669-698. doi:10.1162/002081899551039

38.

Wibbels E. Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance. American Journal of Political Science. 2000;44(4). doi:10.2307/2669275

39.

Bernhard W, Leblang D. Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments. International Organization. 1999;53(01):71-97. doi:10.1162/002081899550814

40.

Clift B. Comparative Political Economy: States, Markets and Global Capitalism. Second edition. Macmillan International Higher Education; 2021.

41.

North DC. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press; 1990. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678

42.

North DC. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Vol The political economy of institutions and decisions. Cambridge University Press; 1990.

43.

Keech WR. Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy. Cambridge University Press; 1995. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609374

44.

Keech WR. Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy. Cambridge University Press; 1995. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609374

45.

Przeworski A, Limongi F. Political Regimes and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1993;7(3):51-69. doi:10.1257/jep.7.3.51

46.

Schumpeter JA, Schumpeter JA, Stiglitz JE. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Routledge; 2010. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/city/detail.action?docID=515353

47.

Crepaz MML. Inclusion versus Exclusion: Political Institutions and Welfare Expenditures. Comparative Politics. 1998;31(1). doi:10.2307/422106

48.

Landa D, Kapstein EB. Inequality, Growth, and Democracy. World Politics. 2001;53(02):264-296. doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0004

49.

Knack S, Keefer P. Does Inequality Harm Growth Only in Democracies? A Replication and Extension. American Journal of Political Science. 1997;41(1). doi:10.2307/2111719

50.

Wright J. Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment. American Journal of Political Science. 2008;52(2):322-343. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00315.x

51.

Olson M. The Rise and Decline of Nations. Yale University Press

52.

Olson M. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. Yale University Press; 1982. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt1nprdd

53.

Hancké B, Rhodes M, Thatcher M. Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradictions, and Complementarities in the European Economy. Oxford University Press; 2007. http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=CityUniLon&isbn=9780191525681

54.

Jensen NM. Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political  Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment. International Organization. 2003;57(03). doi:10.1017/S0020818303573040

55.

Sylwester K. Does Democracy Increase Growth More in New Countries? Economics & Politics. Published online February 2015:n/a-n/a. doi:10.1111/ecpo.12055

56.

Chandra S, Rudra N. Reassessing the Links between Regime Type and Economic Performance: Why Some Authoritarian Regimes Show Stable Growth and Others Do Not. British Journal of Political Science. 2015;45(02):253-285. doi:10.1017/S0007123413000355

57.

Moon C. Foreign Direct Investment, Commitment Institutions, and Time Horizon: How Some Autocrats Do Better than Others. International Studies Quarterly. Published online January 2015:n/a-n/a. doi:10.1111/isqu.12182

58.

Bak D. Political Investment Cycles in Democracies and Autocracies. International Interactions. 2016;42(5):797-819. doi:10.1080/03050629.2016.1173547

59.

Baumgartner FR, Carammia M, Epp DA, Noble B, Rey B, Yildirim TM. Budgetary change in authoritarian and democratic regimes. Journal of European Public Policy. Published online 28 March 2017:1-17. doi:10.1080/13501763.2017.1296482

60.

Chandra S, Rudra N. Reassessing the Links between Regime Type and Economic Performance: Why Some Authoritarian Regimes Show Stable Growth and Others Do Not. British Journal of Political Science. 2015;45(02):253-285. doi:10.1017/S0007123413000355

61.

Osterloh S, Debus M. Partisan politics in corporate taxation. European Journal of Political Economy. 2012;28(2):192-207. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.11.002

62.

BUSEMEYER MR. From myth to reality: Globalisation and public spending in OECD countries revisited. European Journal of Political Research. 2009;48(4):455-482. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.00838.x

63.

Allan JP, Scruggs L. Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies. American Journal of Political Science. 2004;48(3):496-512. doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00083.x

64.

Bermeo N. Does Electoral Democracy Boost Economic Equality? Journal of Democracy. 2009;20(4):21-35. doi:10.1353/jod.0.0112

65.

Franzese RJ. Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science. 2002;5(1):369-421. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.112801.080924

66.

Boix C. Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy. Cambridge University Press; 1998. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174947

67.

Wittman D, Weingast BR, Oxford University Press Staff, Oxford Handbooks Online. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford University Press, Incorporated https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fedited-volume%2F44403

68.

Wittman D, Weingast BR, Oxford University Press Staff, Oxford Handbooks Online. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford University Press, Incorporated https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.oxfordhandbooks.com%2Fview%2F10.1093%2Foxfordhb%2F9780199548477.001.0001%2Foxfordhb-9780199548477

69.

Leighley JE, Oxford Handbooks Online. The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior. Oxford University Press; 2010. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fedited-volume%2F34390

70.

Garrett G. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. Cambridge University Press; 1998. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625633

71.

Wittman D, Weingast BR, Oxford University Press Staff, Oxford Handbooks Online. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford University Press, Incorporated https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fedited-volume%2F44403

72.

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73.

Boix C. Political Parties and the Supply Side of the Economy: The Provision of Physical and Human Capital in Advanced Economies, 1960-90. American Journal of Political Science. 1997;41(3). doi:10.2307/2111676

74.

Boix C. Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy. Cambridge University Press; 1998. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174947

75.

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76.

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77.

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78.

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KORPI W, PALME J. New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975–95. American Political Science Review. 2003;97(03). doi:10.1017/S0003055403000789

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Garrett G. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. Cambridge University Press; 1998. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625633

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84.

Allan JP, Scruggs L. Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies. American Journal of Political Science. 2004;48(3):496-512. doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00083.x

85.

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86.

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87.

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90.

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91.

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97.

Oatley T. How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy. American Journal of Political Science. 1999;43(4). doi:10.2307/2991815

98.

Camyar I. Political Parties, Supply-Side Strategies, and Firms: The Political Micro-Economy of Partisan Politics. The Journal of Politics. 2014;76(03):725-739. doi:10.1017/S0022381614000164

99.

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100.

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Kim H, Kwon C. The Effects of Fiscal Consolidation and Welfare Composition of Spending on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from US Gubernatorial Elections between 1978 and 2006. New Political Economy. 2015;20(2):228-253. doi:10.1080/13563467.2014.923822

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105.

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Hellwig T. Explaining the salience of left-right ideology in postindustrial democracies: The role of structural economic change. European Journal of Political Research. 2008;47(6):687-709. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00778.x

108.

Pinto PM, Weymouth S. Partisan Cycles in Offshore Outsourcing: Evidence from U.S. Imports. Economics & Politics. Published online July 2016. doi:10.1111/ecpo.12078

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Healy AJ, Persson M, Snowberg E. Digging into the Pocketbook: Evidence on Economic Voting from Income Registry Data Matched to a Voter Survey. American Political Science Review. Published online 5 September 2017:1-15. doi:10.1017/S0003055417000314

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Trein P, Beckmann R, Walter S. German Voters in Times of Crisis: The Impact of Perceptions and Economic Context on Electoral Behaviour. German Politics. 2017;26(3):414-439. doi:10.1080/09644008.2016.1266482

112.

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114.

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116.

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CANES-WRONE B, PARK JK. Electoral Business Cycles in OECD Countries. American Political Science Review. 2012;106(01):103-122. doi:10.1017/S0003055411000529

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Dellmuth LM, Schraff D, Stoffel MF. Distributive Politics, Electoral Institutions and European Structural and Investment Funding: Evidence from Italy and France. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 2017;55(2):275-293. doi:10.1111/jcms.12433

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Savage L. The politics of social spending after the Great Recession: The return of partisan policy making. Governance. Published online 2 September 2018. doi:10.1111/gove.12354

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Potrafke N. Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies. Journal of Comparative Economics. 2017;45(4):712-750. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2016.12.004

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King G, Rosen O, Tanner M, Wagner AF. Ordinary Economic Voting Behavior in the Extraordinary Election of Adolf Hitler. The Journal of Economic History. 2008;68(04). doi:10.1017/S0022050708000788

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