Bibliography for IP2031: Comparative Political Economy

1.
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2.
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3.
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4.
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Lichbach MI, Zuckerman AS. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure [Internet]. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2009. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804007

7.
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8.
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9.
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11.
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12.
Lichbach MI, Zuckerman AS. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure [Internet]. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2009. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804007

13.
Wittman D, Weingast BR, Oxford University Press Staff, Oxford Handbooks Online. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy [Internet]. New York: Oxford University Press, Incorporated; Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fedited-volume%2F44403

14.
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15.
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16.
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17.
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18.
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19.
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20.
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28.
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29.
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30.
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31.
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33.
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34.
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35.
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36.
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37.
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38.
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39.
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40.
Clift B. Comparative political economy: states, markets and global capitalism. Second edition. London: Macmillan International Higher Education; 2021.

41.
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42.
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43.
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44.
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45.
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46.
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47.
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48.
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49.
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50.
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51.
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Olson M. The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities [Internet]. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1982. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt1nprdd

53.
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54.
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56.
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57.
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58.
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59.
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61.
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64.
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65.
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66.
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67.
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68.
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74.
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75.
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