Bibliography for IP2031: Comparative Political Economy BETA

[1]

M. I. Lichbach and A. S. Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 [Online]. Available: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804007

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B. Clift, Comparative political economy: states, markets and global capitalism, Second edition. London: Macmillan International Higher Education, 2021.

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J. A. Frieden, Global capitalism: its fall and rise in the twentieth century. New York: W.W. Norton, 2007.

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M. I. Lichbach and A. S. Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 [Online]. Available: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804007

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C. H. Knutsen, ‘Democracy and economic growth: A survey of arguments and results’, International Area Studies Review, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 393–415, Dec. 2012, doi: 10.1177/2233865912455268.

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M. Olson, ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, The American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 3, Sep. 1993, doi: 10.2307/2938736.

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M. Olson, The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982 [Online]. Available: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt1nprdd

[12]

M. I. Lichbach and A. S. Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 [Online]. Available: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804007

[13]

D. Wittman, B. R. Weingast, Oxford University Press Staff, and Oxford Handbooks Online, The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. New York: Oxford University Press, Incorporated [Online]. Available: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fedited-volume%2F44403

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D. P. Quinn and J. T. Woolley, ‘Democracy and National Economic Performance: The Preference for Stability’, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 45, no. 3, Jul. 2001, doi: 10.2307/2669243.

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D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 [Online]. Available: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678

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D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson, Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. London: Profile, 2012.

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A. Przeworski, M. E. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub, and F. Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990, vol. no. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 [Online]. Available: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804946

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D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson, ‘Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth’, Handbook of Economic Growth. North Pole, 2005 [Online]. Available: http://economics.mit.edu/files/4469

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Barry R. Weingast, ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 1–31, 1995 [Online]. Available: http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/1/1.extract

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[27]

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[28]

N. M. Jensen, ‘Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political  Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment’, International Organization, vol. 57, no. 03, Aug. 2003, doi: 10.1017/S0020818303573040.

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K. A. Schultz and B. R. Weingast, ‘The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial  Power in International Competition’, International Organization, vol. 57, no. 01, Feb. 2003, doi: 10.1017/S0020818303571065.

[30]

J. Gandhi, ‘Dictatorial Institutions and their Impact on Economic Growth’, European Journal of Sociology, vol. 49, no. 01, Apr. 2008, doi: 10.1017/S0003975608000015.

[31]

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S. J. Rickard, ‘A Non-Tariff Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: Government Subsidies and Electoral Institutions’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 777–785, Dec. 2012, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00760.x.

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S. D. Ehrlich, ‘Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in  Democracies’, International Organization, vol. 61, no. 03, Jul. 2007, doi: 10.1017/S0020818307070191.

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M. J. Hiscox, ‘The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization’, International Organization, vol. 53, no. 04, pp. 669–698, Sep. 1999, doi: 10.1162/002081899551039.

[38]

E. Wibbels, ‘Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance’, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 44, no. 4, Oct. 2000, doi: 10.2307/2669275.

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W. Bernhard and D. Leblang, ‘Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments’, International Organization, vol. 53, no. 01, pp. 71–97, Dec. 1999, doi: 10.1162/002081899550814.

[40]

B. Clift, Comparative political economy: states, markets and global capitalism, Second edition. London: Macmillan International Higher Education, 2021.

[41]

D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 [Online]. Available: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678

[42]

D. C. North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, vol. The political economy of institutions and decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

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W. R. Keech, Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 [Online]. Available: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609374

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W. R. Keech, Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 [Online]. Available: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609374

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M. M. L. Crepaz, ‘Inclusion versus Exclusion: Political Institutions and Welfare Expenditures’, Comparative Politics, vol. 31, no. 1, Oct. 1998, doi: 10.2307/422106.

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J. Wright, ‘Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment’, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 322–343, Apr. 2008, doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00315.x.

[51]

M. Olson, The rise and decline of nations. London: Yale University Press.

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M. Olson, The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982 [Online]. Available: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt1nprdd

[53]

B. Hancké, M. Rhodes, and M. Thatcher, Beyond varieties of capitalism: conflict, contradictions, and complementarities in the European economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 [Online]. Available: http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=CityUniLon&isbn=9780191525681

[54]

N. M. Jensen, ‘Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political  Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment’, International Organization, vol. 57, no. 03, Aug. 2003, doi: 10.1017/S0020818303573040.

[55]

K. Sylwester, ‘Does Democracy Increase Growth More in New Countries?’, Economics & Politics, p. n/a-n/a, Feb. 2015, doi: 10.1111/ecpo.12055.

[56]

S. Chandra and N. Rudra, ‘Reassessing the Links between Regime Type and Economic Performance: Why Some Authoritarian Regimes Show Stable Growth and Others Do Not’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 45, no. 02, pp. 253–285, Apr. 2015, doi: 10.1017/S0007123413000355.

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C. Moon, ‘Foreign Direct Investment, Commitment Institutions, and Time Horizon: How Some Autocrats Do Better than Others’, International Studies Quarterly, p. n/a-n/a, Jan. 2015, doi: 10.1111/isqu.12182.

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[59]

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[61]

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