Bibliography for IP2031: Comparative Political Economy - Reading Lists Online at City University London

1.
Lichbach MI, Zuckerman AS. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure [Internet]. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2009. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804007

2.
Clift B. Comparative political economy: states, markets and global capitalism. Second edition. London: Macmillan International Higher Education; 2021.

3.
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4.
Wittman D, Weingast BR, Oxford University Press Staff, Oxford Handbooks Online. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy [Electronic resource]. New York: Oxford University Press, Incorporated. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fedited-volume%2F44403

5.
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6.
Lichbach MI, Zuckerman AS. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure [Internet]. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2009. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804007

7.
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8.
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9.
Olson M. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. The American Political Science Review. 1993 Sep;87(3). doi:10.2307/2938736

10.
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11.
Olson M. The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities [Electronic resource]. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1982. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt1nprdd

12.
Lichbach MI, Zuckerman AS. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure [Internet]. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2009. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804007

13.
Wittman D, Weingast BR, Oxford University Press Staff, Oxford Handbooks Online. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy [Electronic resource]. New York: Oxford University Press, Incorporated. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fedited-volume%2F44403

14.
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15.
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16.
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17.
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18.
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19.
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20.
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21.
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22.
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23.
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25.
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26.
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27.
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28.
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29.
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30.
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31.
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32.
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33.
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34.
Rickard SJ. A Non-Tariff Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: Government Subsidies and Electoral Institutions. International Studies Quarterly. 2012 Dec;56(4):777–85. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00760.x

35.
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36.
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37.
Hiscox MJ. The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization. International Organization. 1999 Sep;53(04):669–98. doi:10.1162/002081899551039

38.
Wibbels E. Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance. American Journal of Political Science. 2000 Oct;44(4). doi:10.2307/2669275

39.
Bernhard W, Leblang D. Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments. International Organization. 1999 Dec;53(01):71–97. doi:10.1162/002081899550814

40.
Clift B. Comparative political economy: states, markets and global capitalism. Second edition. London: Macmillan International Higher Education; 2021.

41.
North DC. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance [Internet]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1990. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678

42.
North DC. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. The political economy of institutions and decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1990.

43.
Keech WR. Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy [Internet]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1995. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609374

44.
Keech WR. Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy [Internet]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1995. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609374

45.
Przeworski A, Limongi F. Political Regimes and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1993 Aug;7(3):51–69. doi:10.1257/jep.7.3.51

46.
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47.
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48.
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49.
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50.
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51.
Olson M. The rise and decline of nations. London: Yale University Press.

52.
Olson M. The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities [Electronic resource]. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1982. Available from: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/city.ac.uk?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt1nprdd

53.
Hancké B, Rhodes M, Thatcher M. Beyond varieties of capitalism: conflict, contradictions, and complementarities in the European economy [Electronic resource]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2007. Available from: http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=CityUniLon&isbn=9780191525681

54.
Jensen NM. Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment. International Organization. 2003 Aug;57(03). doi:10.1017/S0020818303573040

55.
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56.
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57.
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58.
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59.
Baumgartner FR, Carammia M, Epp DA, Noble B, Rey B, Yildirim TM. Budgetary change in authoritarian and democratic regimes. Journal of European Public Policy. 2017 Mar 28;1–17. doi:10.1080/13501763.2017.1296482

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61.
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62.
BUSEMEYER MR. From myth to reality: Globalisation and public spending in OECD countries revisited. European Journal of Political Research. 2009 Jun;48(4):455–82. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.00838.x

63.
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64.
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65.
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66.
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67.
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85.
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